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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Once every few years I wake up in the middle of the night in a cold sweat thinking back 
to one of those all-too revealing questions that students ask about argumentation. 
Sometimes the question is a rhetorical question, like “Aren’t these critical tests, well, sort 
of obvious?” More often the question is genuine, posed on the naïve assumption that 
there is an answer ready at hand. It’s a question like “How well do these schemas work? I 
mean, do they apply to all arguments?” I wake up because I don’t know the answer. 
Often I don’t even know what an answer would look like. 
 Not many argumentation scholars ask questions like this last one—and it’s not 
because it is sophomoric or trivial. It is actually a question that is so hard and difficult 
that one hesitates to even raise the issue. David Hitchcock’s paper is a refreshing 
exception to this pattern of neglect. He clearly sees that how natural language inferences 
and arguments work in fact is an important source of insight into how arguments work in 
theory, and how arguments should work. This paper is a sequel to his 2002 study. There 
he examined inferences in scholarly books to test the applicability of his covering 
generalization approach (CG) to inference evaluation (Hitchcock 1985, 1992, 1994, 
1998). Here he tests the applicability of covering generalizations to evaluating inferences 
made by people in their call-ins to radio and television talk shows. And like the previous 
study with scholarly books, Hitchcock concludes in this study “that the covering 
generalization approach to evaluating inferences can be applied successfully” to spoken 
inferences and arguments (p. 16). In the following two sections I will explain why I think 
that conclusion is premature. The first concern has to do with what it would mean to 
“empirically” test whether “the covering generalization approach fits our habits of 
reasoning and argument” (p. 3). The second concern has to do with the object of the 
test—what general category is represented by the cases analyzed. 
 
2. (HOW) DOES THIS TEST THE COVERING GENERALIZATION APPROACH?  
 
At first glance, Hitchcock (here and 2002) would seem to ask a simple question that 
should get a simple answer: Can CG be applied successfully to actual discourse? Yes or 
SCOTT JACOBS 
no? And it would seem that the way to answer this question is to do just what was done in 
these studies. Find some inferences in discourse. Unitize the reasons and conclusion. 
Formulate the covering generalization. Evaluate the covering generalization. At each step 
you find out, can you do it? If you can for all steps, then you have an affirmative answer 
to the research question.  
 But this is not much of a test. Granted, if either study had failed to accomplish any 
of these steps it would be a serious problem. And in all likelihood only the author of CG 
could expect to get that kind of finding taken seriously. Failure for anyone else would be 
taken to mean that they just didn’t understand CG. But if that had happened, we would 
like to know what went wrong. What kind of troubles emerged and what do they reveal 
about inference and argument in general? Now, that didn’t happen, but we still would like 
to know the answer to some similar questions: What kind of difficulties occurred in 
applying CG? Did CG get it right? 
 The very elegance and straightforwardness of the covering generalization concept 
is part of the problem. A covering generalization is likely to be found for any argument or 
inference because it is practically built into the procedure. The very definition of an 
inference or argument already produces ready to analyze cases, i.e., premise-like reasons 
and explicit conclusions, all presumably issued as assertives and ready to represent in the 
standard canonical form of declarative sentences. Anything else never gets into the 
process. Finding a topical link is the key to producing a covering generalization, and 
pretty much any coherent, sensible discourse is going to contain a topic. And if it weren’t 
coherent and sensible, there wouldn’t be an inference to work with in the first place. So, 
finding a category contained in (one of) the premises that is also contained in the 
conclusion is not unexpected.  
 The more difficult test would be to see whether or not the covering generalization 
was formulated in a principled way and captures the intuitive connection between reasons 
and conclusions. One way to get at this would be to assess consistency in formulation of 
the covering generalization—the sort of thing standardly sought with measures of inter-
rater reliability or test-retest reliability (would the same coder come up with the same 
formulation twice?). Another way might be to have ordinary language users evaluate or 
choose among alternative formulations. This would be tricky because it would require 
principled decisions about what is the same and what is a different content formulation. 
But it would raise an important question for argumentation theory generally: Just what 
differences in informal formulations matter and why?    
 Another problem in assessing success in applying CG comes with evaluations. 
Here we find a common tension between normative and descriptive concerns with natural 
language use as well as the standard problems that arise in deciding how to apply a 
principle of charity. Hitchcock reports that the covering generalizations in 15 of the 37 
cases were judged “invalid.” Is that because of bad reasoning by callers or because the 
covering generalization wasn’t how the callers were reasoning? Hitchcock (2002) also 
found that 26% of the inferences in scholarly books were “invalid.” So, if CG is getting it 
right even the published and reviewed writing of trained academics displays pretty poor 
reasoning.  
Now, perhaps these evaluations are appropriate. And perhaps what is empirical is 
the questions of whether evaluations of natural language inferences and arguments can be 
successfully made. But if that is the case, then we need more than just a report of what 
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evaluations were made. We need some standard for a principled assessment of successful 
and unsuccessful evaluations. 
 
3. WHAT IS THIS STUDY ABOUT?  
 
Hitchcock (this study, 2002) is quite properly concerned that his findings be projectable 
to the general category of natural language inference and argument. But there is a real 
conceptual problem in terms of what that is. The focus on regularities and propensities in 
the classifications of this study and in comparison to the 2002 study would suggest a 
picture of natural discourse based on a kind of “freeze-frame” of everything everyone 
everywhere is saying and writing right now or across some broader strip of time. But that 
is not the only theoretically relevant way to think about our subject-matter. Our theories 
project into a domain that is constantly changing. New kinds of arguments emerge; old 
ones fade away. Structural distinctions of real importance may or may not correspond to 
what happens frequently or infrequently. Our theoretically relevant domain is as much a 
domain of possibilities as it is actualities. We are often interested in what does happen 
because of what it tells us about what could or could not happen. 
Unlike most researchers—including heavily quantitative social science 
researchers—Hitchcock is at pains to apply selection methods that are genuinely random. 
Way too many researchers report as a “random” sample what is in fact haphazard, 
arbitrary, or a matter of convenience. The idea is that without an unbiased sample of 
natural language arguments, one cannot make warranted inferences about the distribution 
of properties in the general population based on the distribution of those properties in the 
sample. Hitchcock is right that anything less will call into question what the cases he has 
studied represent. Unknown as well as known biases in sampling necessarily restrict and 
distort the nature of the population being sampled.  
 But that projection to the broader category of natural language inference and 
argument is already blocked. Both studies began with convenience samples. Inferences 
from the cases sampled stop with the larger group that was identified as a matter of 
convenience (books at McMaster’s library; call-ins to the radio/tv shows at the place, 
date, and time recorded). The limitations here can be seen by considering alternatives to 
the contrast between “written” and “spoken” discourse. It could have been classified just 
as easily as planned/unplanned, initiated/solicited, academic/everyday, general/political, 
reviewed/unreviewed, formal/casual, or any other number and combination of attributes. 
The point is that we have two case studies of indeterminate classification. We really can’t 
make much of the quantitative similarities and differences. It’s just a start. But it is a start.  
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